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The Manufacturer's Duty in "Second Collision"
Automobile Product Liability Cases
INTRODUCTION
Automobile manufacturers have long been subject to liability for
damages caused by a defect in their product which contributes to an
accident or collision. In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,' the court
ruled that an automobile manufacturer whose defective wooden steer-
ing wheel collapsed and caused an accident was liable for its negligence
in building the wheel and failing to inspect it, not only to the buyer of
the automobile, but also to others who may foreseeably be injured by
the negligence of the manufacturer. Davlin v. Henry Ford & Sons
2
recognized the duty of a tractor manufacturer "to use reasonable care
in employing designs, selecting materials, and making assemblies, in
the construction of a tractor, which would fairly meet any emergency
of use which could.reasonably be anticipated,"8 but the case found that
the plaintiff had not met his burden of proof in proving that the tractor
seat broke because of the manufacturer's negligence. Carpini v. Pitts-
burgh & Weirton Bus Co.4 allowed recovery against a bus manufacturer
on the theory that it negligently positioned the pet cock so that, when
the pet cock broke, air escaped causing the braking system to fail.
The liability of a manufacturer for negligent design is covered in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 395 which reads:
Negligent Manufacture of Chattel Dangerous Unless Carefully
Made
A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the
manufacture of a chattel which, unless carefully made, he should
recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing physical
harm to those who use it for a purpose for which the manufac-
turer should expect it to be used and to those whom he should
expect to be endangered by its probable use, is subject to liability
for physical harm caused to them by its lawful use in a manner
and for a purpose for which it is supplied.5
1. 217 N.Y. 382, 1il N.E. 1050 (1916).
2. 20 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1927).
3. Id. at 319.
4. 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954).




Chattel Made Under a Dangerous Plan or Design
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which
makes it dangerous for the uses for which it is manufactured is
subject to liability to others whom he should expect to use the
chattel or to be endangered by its probable use for physical harm
caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption
of a safe plan or design.6
Automobile manufacturers have also been found liable for defects
in design because of breaches of implied warranties of merchantability
7
and fitness.8 The leading case based on the implied warranty theory is
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.9 In this case, the court allowed
recovery on an implied warranty of merchantability theory to the wife
of the purchaser of an automobile when she suffered personal injuries
due to an accident caused by the failure of the steering mechanism.
The court ruled that recovery did not depend on negligence or knowl-
edge of the defect. 10 Henningsen stated that there was no horizontal
privity" requirement in implied warranties, for the manufacturer
extended the warranty to the purchaser of the automobile, members
of his family, and to other persons occupying or using it with his
consent.12 To say that use by such persons is not within the anticipation
of the parties to such a warranty, said the court, would be "wholly
opposed to reality.' 1 3 However, since the majority of states have
adopted alternative A of section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial
Code,14 the implied warranty will usually not extend to passengers
6. Id. § 398.
7. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314.
Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade.
(I) Unless excluded or modified . . . a warranty that the goods shall be mer-
chantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind ....
8. Id. § 2-315.
Implied Warranty: Fitness for a Particular Purpose.
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's
skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or
modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose.
9. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
10. Id. at 372, 161 A.2d at 77.
11. Vertical privity deals with the question from whom does the warranty run.
Horizontal privity deals with the question to whom does the warranty run. Salvadore v.
Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 224 Pa. Super. 377, 379, 307 A.2d 598, 400 (1973).
12. 32 N.J. at 414-15, 161 A.2d at 100.
13. Id.
14. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318.
Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied.
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outside the family or household of the automobile owner or to persons
injured in an accident who were not riding in the defective auto-
mobile.15
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.'6 applied the theory of strict
liability in tort to defective products. The court ruled that a plaintiff
who was injured using a power tool need not prove negligence in a
products liability case. He must prove only that the manufacturer
placed the product on the market knowing that it would be used with-
out inspection for defects, and that the product proved to have a defect
which caused injury to a human being.'7 Vandermark v. Ford Motor
Co.18 first applied the strict liability in tort doctrine to automobiles,
holding that a manufacturer was strictly liable in tort to a buyer of
an automobile with defective brakes. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts has adopted the theory of strict liability for defective products:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user
or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
Alternative A
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who
is in the family or household of his buyer or is a guest in his home if it is reasonable
to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section.
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who
may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section.
Alternative C
A seller's warranty express or implied extends to any person who may reasonably
be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach
of warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section with
respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom the warranty extends.
15. But see Salvadore v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 224 Pa. Super. 377, 307 A.2d 398 (1973).
16. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
17. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
18. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
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(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller-"
Elmore v. American Motors Corp.20 extended the strict liability doc-
trine in California to non-users. The court ruled that, since a defec-
tively constructed drive shaft constitutes a hazard not only to the driver
and passengers of an automobile, and since it was foreseeable that
others might be injured by the defect, the strict liability doctrine
should also extend to protect bystanders and drivers and passengers of
other automobiles.21 This approach has not been adopted in the
majority of courts, which have adhered strictly to the Restatement, and
in those states strict liability still extends only to "users" or "con-
sumers."
"Second collision ' 22 liability of automobile manufacturers is a con-
tinuing source of controversy. "Second collision" automobile cases
are those cases in which the party injured in an automobile accident
claims that the automobile manufacturer is liable, not for contributing
to the original accident, but for designing the vehicle so that one in-
volved in an accident would be unreasonably subject to injury from the
design. The plaintiff claims that the manufacturer has a duty to antici-
pate that the automobile may become involved in a collision, and that
the manufacturer must design the automobile to be "crashworthy" in
order to minimize injury. The amount of recovery will correspond to
that portion of damage or injury caused by the defectively designed
product over and above the damage or injury which would probably
have occurred as a result of the impact or collision had the defective
design been absent.2 3
THE "SIMULTANEOUS COLLISION" CASES
Distinct from second collision cases, though often classified with
them, 24 are those cases where the injury caused by the design happens
simultaneously with the collision. This type of case is illustrated by
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
20. 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969).
21. Id. at 586, 451 P.2d at 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
22. The term "second collision" was coined in the early 1950's by Elmer Paul, then with
the Indiana State Highway Patrol. Huelke, Identification of Injury Mechanisms in Auto-
mobile Crashes, in 1973 LEGAL MEDICINE ANNUAL 203, 207 (C. Wecht ed. 1973).
23. Mieher v. Brown, 3 I1. App. 3d 802, 278 N.E.2d 869 (1972).
24. See Sklaw, "Second Collision" Liability: The Need for Uniformity, 4 SEr. HALL L.
REV. 499, 507 n.40 (1973).
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Hatch v. Ford Motor Co. 2 5 In Hatch, a six-year-old ran into the front
of a parked automobile manufactured by the defendant. The boy's
eyeball was pierced by the automobile's radiator ornament. The court,
in denying recovery, said that the defendant had no duty to anticipate
that a person would run into its radiator ornament.
A similar case is Kahn v. Chrysler Corp.26 In Kahn, a seven-year-old
drove his bicycle into a parked 1957 Dodge, striking his right front
temple region on the protruding left rear fin of the vehicle. The court
also allowed no recovery, saying that the manufacturer had no duty to
foresee a bicycle being driven into its product.
In Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn,2 7 a driver of a 1956 Ford had to make a
sudden stop to avoid hitting a vehicle entering the highway. A pas-
senger's head smashed against the sharp, jagged edges of an ashtray,
causing the loss of vision in one eye. The court ruled that the evidence
was sufficient to present to the jury the question as to the manufac-
turer's negligence in failing to adequately inspect the ashtray and of
whether the manufacturer's negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury.
In another Eighth Circuit case, Schneider v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,28
while the plaintiff, in a dimly lit garage, was bending down to see if
his keys were in the ignition of an automobile manufactured by the
defendant, he pierced his eye on the left vent window of the vehicle.
The court ruled that the plaintiff had not acted in a reasonably fore-
seeable manner, so that any negligence of the defendant would not be
the proximate cause of the accident, and there could be no recovery.
THE "CRASH-PROOF" CASES
Predictably enough, no court has allowed recovery on the claim that
a manufacturer's automobile should be built so that one involved in a
collision should be able to escape free from injury. In Walz v. Erie-
Lackawanna Railroad Co.,2 9 the court ruled that there was no duty to
make an automobile crash-proof on the part of the manufacturer of a
1960 Dodge which was hit by a train. In Willis v. Chrysler Corp.8O the
court stated that the manufacturer of a police vehicle had no duty to
25. 163 Cal. App. 2d 393, 329 P.2d 605 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
26. 221 F. Supp. 677 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
27. 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959).
28. 401 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1968).
29. CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 5722 (Ind. Dist. Ct. 1967).
30. 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
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build the automobile so that it could withstand a high speed collision
and maintain its structural integrity. The automobile, which was travel-
ing at sixty-five to seventy miles per hour when the collision occurred,
broke into two sections upon impact. The court stated that the manu-
facturer had no duty to make the vehicle accident-proof or fool-proof.
Enders v. Volkswagenwerk A.G.31 decided that there was no duty on
the part of the manufacturer of a Volkswagen to prevent or minimize
injury due to a head-on collision. Again using the "crash-proof" argu-
ment, the court in Snipes v. General Motors Corp.,3 2 refused to allow
recovery against the manufacturer of a 1963 Corvair on grounds of
inadequate design after the driver crossed over the center line and
became involved in a head-on collision with a 1968 Ford.
"SECOND COLLISION"-THE Evans APPROACH
A leading true second collision case is Evans v. General Motors
Corp.33 In Evans, the plaintiff sued a station wagon manufacturer
charging negligence, breach of implied warranty, and strict liability in
tort for an allegedly defectively designed "X" frame which permitted
the left side of the automobile to collapse against the plaintiff's de-
cedent after a collision. The plaintiff contended that the automobile
should have been designed with side frames to make it sturdier. The
court denied recovery for three reasons. First, the intended purpose of
an automobile does not include getting involved in a collision. Second,
there is no duty on the part of the manufacturer to produce an accident-
proof vehicle. The court pointed out that there was a possibility that
automobiles might be driven into bodies of water, but said it would be
ridiculous to suggest that automobiles should be equipped with pon-
toons.34 The third reason the court refused recovery was that any crash-
worthy standards would be beyond the scope of the judiciary, and
should be left to the legislature.3 5
31. CCH PROD. LIAB. RFP. 5930 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1968).
32. CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 6037 (Ohio C.P. 1968).
.33. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966). Cf. Schemel v. General
Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), where the same court which decided Evans
ruled that a driver whose automobile was struck in the rear by a 1960 Chevrolet Impala
traveling at one hundred fifteen miles per hour could not collect from the Chevrolet
manufacturer on the theory that the manufacturer should not have built an automobile
capable of traveling at such a speed. Denying recovery, the court emphasized that the auto-
mobile was not dangerous for the use for which it was intended and that the manufacturer
was not bound to anticipate reckless action. They again said that this was a legislative, not
a judicial concern. Id. at 805.
34. 359 F.2d at 825.
35. See also Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967), ampli-
fying the Evans considerations.
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Walton v. Chrysler Corp.8 6 concerned the seat of a 1963 Plymouth
Valiant which broke away from the floor after the automobile was hit
in the rear with considerable force. The plaintiff sued on the theory
that the seat was not designed to withstand the impact of a collision
on the highway. The court said that there was no duty to design an
automobile to be safe in an accident, emphasizing that if such a duty
should exist, it was the responsibility of the legislative branch to enact
it.
Edgar v. Nachman 7 denied recovery against a manufacturer of a
1963 Volkswagen on the theory that the gas tank and gas cap were
designed defectively so that the vehicle burst into flames upon a head-
on collision. Citing Campo v. Scofield,38 the court ruled that there
could be no recovery because the danger was not latent or concealed
but discoverable upon reasonable investigation. According to the court,
a manufacturer can only be held liable for latent defects, and there is
no requirement that an automobile be accident-proof or crashworthy.
McClung v. Ford Motor Co.39 ruled that there was no cause of action
against the manufacturer of a 1965 Mustang for designing the auto-
mobile with a rigid steering column, an unpadded steering wheel and
horn rim, no shoulder harnesses, and no seat locks to lock the rear
portion of the driver's seat into position. In the case, the driver's head
had slammed into the steering column after a collision, and he became
totally blind as a result of the second collision. In denying recovery,
the court cited economic considerations; that, by imposing a second
collision liability on the manufacturer, the poor may not be able to
afford automobiles. The court stated that political practicalities made
it impossible to have absolute safety.
The economic considerations were the main reasons for denying
recovery in Seattle First National Bank v. Talbert.40 The plaintiffs
complained that only a thin sheet of metal prevented front seat pas-
sengers from absorbing the shock in a Volkswagen Microbus that was
36. 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969). See also General Motors Corp. v. Howard, 244 So. 2d
726 (Miss. 1971); Ford Motor Co. v. Simpson, 233 So. 2d 797 (Miss. 1970).
37. 37 App. Div. 86, 323 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1971). Cf. Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151,
305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.YS.2d 644 (1973).
38. 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
39. 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. W.Va. 1971), afl'd, 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1973).
40. CCH PRoD. A.B. REP. 6550 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1970). See also Drelsonstok v. Volks-
wagenwerk A.G., CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 7092 (4th Cir. 1974). Other cases following the
Evans approach include: Yetter v. Rajeski, 364 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.J. 1973); Alexander v.
Seaboard Air Line R.R., 346 F. Supp. 320 (W.D.N.C. 1971); Ford v. Rupple, 504 P.2d 686
(Mont. 1972); Biavaschi v. Frost, CCH PROD. LAB. REP. 6547 (N.J. Super. Ct., Law Div.
1970); Burkhard v. Short, CCH PROD. LAB. REP. 6549 (Ohio C.P. 1971).
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hit from the rear. The court pointed out that this was one of the least
expensive, most lightly built vehicles on the market, and the plaintiffs
knew that when they rode in it.
"SECOND COLLISION"-THE Larsen APPROACH
Larsen v. General Motors Corp.41 stated that there was a cause of
action against the manufacturer of a 1963 Chevrolet Corvair whose
allegedly defectively designed steering assembly thrust rearward into
the driver's head after a head-on collision. In Larsen, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit declined to apply the
approach used by the Seventh Circuit in Evans, saying that view was
too narrow and restrictive. The court stated that in determining the
intended use of a product one must take into account the environment
in which the product would be used. It cited statistics which stated
that between one-fourth and two-thirds of all automobiles at some time
during their use will be involved in an accident producing injury or
death. 42 Larsen stated that a manufacturer had a duty to provide a
reasonably safe means of transportation within the present state of
the art. Rejecting the concept that such matters should be left to the
legislature, the court wrote that it was the duty of the judiciary to
supplement the safety laws enacted by the legislature. General negli-
gence principles were applied, the court calling the defect "latent"
and saying that the duty of the manufacturer was to correct the design
defect or warn the customer about the latently defective condition.
In Mickle v. Blackmon,43 the court stated that there was a cause of
action against an automobile manufacturer when the circular knob
of a gear shift lever broke when a passenger was thrust against it after
a collision, thus impaling the victim. The court said that because the
manufacturer knew with certainty that its automobiles would become
involved in collisions, it had a duty to use care in the placement, design,
and construction of such interior parts as shafts, levers, knobs, and
handles.
Interpreting Pennsylvania law, the federal district court in Dyson v.
General Motors Corp.,44 ruled that a passenger must be reasonably safe
from harm in an automobile and that the manufacturer's duty was
41. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
42. Id. at 502. See O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 299, 348 (1963).
48. 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
44. 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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coterminous with the foreseeability of the harm. In Dyson, a passenger
of a 1965 Buick Electra claimed the vehicle's roof was defectively de-
signed because the roof collapsed after the vehicle turned over during
an accident.
The court in Mieher v. Brown,45 found the rationale of Larsen more
cogent and reasoned that the Evans approach. To hold otherwise, said
the court:
... would permit the manufacturer in the face of the high inci-
dence of injuries sustained by those injured in automobile acci-
dents, to fill the passenger compartment with all sorts of sharp
protrusions and gimcracks capable of producing severe injuries or
death and which serve no purpose other than eye appeal, and then
survey the resulting misery with the complacent knowledge that,
since these items did not initiate the chain of events, it was secure
from responsibility.46
Second, the court found no sound reason to depart from its traditional
definition of proximate cause in terms of injury, not in terms of col-
lision.47 The third reason was that the automobile industry should not
be allowed to avoid responsibility by arguing that it is impossible to
build a crash-proof automobile. The manufacturer should use ordi-
nary care to avoid creations of risks to the public.
In Passwaters v. General Motors Corp.,4s the plaintiff, while driving
a motorcycle, and attempting to pass a 1964 Buick Skylark, collided with
the automobile. The leg of the plaintiff's daughter, a passenger in the
rear of the motorcycle, came into contact with the ornamental wheel
cover blade tips which protruded approximately three inches from the
wheel cover. The court stated that there was a duty to anticipate those
second collisions which were foreseeable. The court decided that
since Iowa, the state whose laws were being applied, had recognized
the doctrine of strict liability, that doctrine should apply in this case.
45. 3 Ill. App. 3d 802, 278 N.E.2d 869 (1972).
46. Id. at 811, 278 N.E.2d at 876.
47. See ILL. PATTERN JURY INSt--CIVIL § 15.01 (2d ed. 1971):
When I use the expression "proximate cause", I mean [that] [a] [any] cause which,
in natural or probable sequence, produced the injury complained of ....
48. 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972). Other cases following the Larsen approach include:
Richman v. General Motors Corp., 437 F.2d 196 (lst Cir. 1971); Grundmanis v. British
Motor Corp., 308 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Walker v. International Harvester Co.,
294 F. Supp. 1095 (W.D. Okla. 1969); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d
1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); Badorek v. General Motors Corp., 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 90
Cal. Rptr. 305 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Noonan v. Buick Co., 211 So. 2d 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1968); Friend v. General Motors Corp., 118 Ga. App. 763, 165 S.E.2d 734 (1968).
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SHOULD AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS HAVE A
"SECOND COLLISION" DUTY?
It seems clear that there should be some duty on the part of the
manufacturer to avoid exposing persons to unreasonable dangers after
an automobile has been involved in a collision. Although automobiles
are not made for the purpose of getting into accidents, the manufac-
turer knows that a significant percentage of its vehicles will be involved
in collisions. With the great risk of harm that an automobile collision
can bring, we should insist that the manufacturers use reasonable
means to protect accident victims. It is true, however, that there are
other products which the manufacturer knows will cause harm, but
for which society will not hold the manufacturer liable when the harm
is caused. For example, the knife manufacturer knows that a significant
percentage of people will be cut by his product. The gun manufac-
turer knows that its product will be used in robberies, in homicides,
and in accidental injuries, but we do not hold the manufacturer liable
when a person is injured by such a weapon. The difference is that, in
the case of the knife, the goal of a sharp cutting knife and the goal of
a safe knife are diametrically opposed, it being impossible to produce
a safe, sharp knife. Given the choice of having sharp, unsafe knives
or only dull knives, society has opted for the sharp knife, saying that it
is not unreasonably dangerous, and imposes no liability on the manu-
facturer when a person is cut by the knife. In the case of DDT,
society has determined that its pesticidal effects are not worth its
poisonous effects on humans, and has banned its use except for experi-
mentation. 49 In the case of the automobile, it is not necessary to ban
the driving of an automobile in order to insure reasonable safety to
passengers after an accident. Taking into account the economic bar-
riers, a manufacturer should be held liable if he fails to make his
vehicle reasonably safe within the present state of the art.50 In other
areas besides automobiles we have held a manufacturer liable for a
dangerous product even though the product was not dangerous for its
primary use. For example, in Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc.,51 the
49. 40 C.F.R. § 162.18 (1973).
50. See Gray v. General Motors Corp., 434 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1970), holding that a
manufacturer is not liable for failure to install an energy absorbing steering mechanism
when the court found that the technical ability to install such a mechanism did not occur
until years after the accident. See also Olson v. Artic Enterprises, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 761
(D.N.D. 1972).
51. 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962).
612
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court held a floor polish manufacturer liable for having a poisonous
floor polish with no warning even though floor polish is not meant for
drinking.
The crashworthiness standard should not be left only to the legis-
lature, as some critics of second collision liability have urged.52 It is
true that there are extensively detailed laws, both state and federal,
governing the condition of automobiles.5 3 However, the theory that
the crashworthiness standards should be left to the legislature is effec-
tively rebutted by Houser's example of the "egg shell automobile."M
A manufacturer could make his vehicle out of a material that breaks
like an egg shell. Every time the "egg shell automobile" would become
involved in a collision, it would crumble, severely injuring the passen-
gers. Yet, unless there is legislation outlawing the material, those who
advocate strict deference of the judiciary to the legislature would allow
no recovery. A better approach would be to say that the judiciary
should supplement the legislature, and that, when there is a wrong,
the judiciary should offer a remedy even though the legislature has
remained silent.
STRICT LIABILITY AND "SECOND COLLISIONS"
Courts have listed three reasons for adopting the doctrine of strict
liability in tort to product liability cases. Two of the reasons were
stated in Badorek v. General Motors Corp.:55
(1) that the manufacturer by placing the machine on the market
had impliedly represented that it was safe for use and that the
plaintiff had purchased it and used it in reliance upon that repre-
sentation ... and
(2) that the losses due to defective products unreasonably dan-
gerous should be placed upon the manufacturer rather than the
user because the former is in a better position to insure against the
liability and distribute the premium to the public by adding it
to the price of the product.
52. See Hoenig & Werber, Automobile "Crashworthiness": An Untenable Doctrine, 20
CLv. ST. L. R-y. 578 (1971). See also Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 346 F. Supp. 320
(W.D.N.C. 1971). "If the American people are to travel in Sherman tanks, the Congress,
and not the courts, should decree it." Id. at 327.
53. E.g., National Traffic & Motor Vehicle Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-431 (1970). See
Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972), for an interpretation
of the federal safety standards.
54. Houser, Crashworthiness: Defective Product Design-Secondary Impact Liability in
Texas, 4 ST. MARY's L.J. 303, 307 (1972).
55. 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 917, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305, 314-15 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
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A third reason, noted in Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,6 6 is
to provide an incentive for the manufacturer to maximize safe design.
It seems that these three considerations-the manufacturer's implied
representation, the desire to allocate the risk to the manufacturer, and
the need to provide an incentive for the manufacturer-would be just
as valid in crashworthy product liability cases as in other product lia-
bility cases. 57
Unlike the concept of negligence, in strict liability the plaintiff
need not prove whether the defendant exercised reasonable care under
the circumstances. 58 In strict liability cases, the plaintiff need only
prove that his injury was caused by a product in a "defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer."5 9 The Restatement
(Second) of Torts defines an "unreasonably dangerous" product:
The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the com-
munity as to its characteristics. 60
Therefore, while the negligence standard looks toward the reasonable-
ness of the manufacturer's acts in making the product, the strict lia-
bility standard looks toward the product itself and the expectations of
the user or consumer of the product. In determining whether a product
is unreasonably dangerous we use the same criteria we use in deter-
mining negligence-the probability of damages, the amount of possible
harm, and the cost of the design implementation-but from a different
perspective. 61 In the negligence test we ask whether a reasonable manu-
facturer, taking into account the probability of injuries, the amount of
possible harm, and the cost of eliminating the danger, should have
manufactured the product.62 In the strict liability test, we ask whether
56. 345 F. Supp. 353, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
57. See Sklaw, "Second Collision" Liability: The Need for Uniformity, 4 SET. HALL L.
REV. 499 (1973). ". .. [T]here is really no logical justification for applying the theory of
negligence while denying that of strict liability in tort." Id. at 520.
58. Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1277 (8th Cir. 1972).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). But see Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,
8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972), which rejected the need to prove
the product "unreasonably dangerous," saying that the plaintiff need only prove the prod-
uct was in a "defective condition." It is suggested that this distinction is more semantics
than substance. See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
"... [T]he phrase 'defective condition' has no independent meaning, and the attempt to
use it is apt to prove misleading." Id. at 15.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment i (1965).
61. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965). "In strict liability,
except for the defendant's scienter, the test is the same as that for negligence." Id. at 15.
62. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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a reasonable user or consumer, had he known of the defect, taking into
account the probability of damages, the amount of possible harm, and
the increased cost of manufacturing the product which would be passed
on to the user or consumer, would have used or consumed the product.
63
This does not mean that the manufacturer becomes the insurer of the
user's or consumer's safety when the product is used or consumed. For
example, in 1960 the state of the art of automobile manufacturing had
not yet progressed to the point where a commercially practical auto-
mobile collapsible steering column could be manufactured." A rea-
sonable user, forced with the choice of having a rigid steering column
or having no steering column at all unless he paid an exorbitant price,
would have used the rigid steering column despite its unsafety in the
event of a collision. Today, a reasonable user would be willing to pay
the slightly greater cost for a collapsible steering column because of
the decreased possibility of injury from second collision with the
steering column.
It is true that in most cases, a plaintiff who can prove a cause of
action on a strict liability theory can also prove a cause of action on a
negligence theory. 5 However, there have been some cases where negli-
gence liability could not be proved but strict liability could. In Cun-
ningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital,66 the plaintiff contracted
serum hepatitis from blood received in a blood transplant in the de-
fendant hospital. At the time, serum hepatitis was virtually impossible
to detect in blood and the defendant used all reasonable means to keep
the blood safe. The court ruled that there was a cause of action in strict
liability,67 for the plaintiff would not have used the blood had he
known of the defect. In O'Keefe v. Boeing Co.,68 the court stated that
a plaintiff, if she could prove that a flaw in the verticle fin caused an
airplane crash she could recover under a strict liability theory even
63. See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
64. Gray v. General Motors Corp., 434 F.2d 110, 113-14 (8th Cir. 1970).
65. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1114 (1960):
.. an honest estimate might very well be that there is not one case in a hundred in
which strict liability would result in recovery where negligence does not.
66. 47 111. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
67. Id. at 453-54, 266 N.E.2d at 902. But see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10021 (Supp. 1973),
which states:
Notwithstanding any other law, no hospital, blood bank, or other entity or person
shall be held liable for death or injury resulting from the lawful transfusion of blood,
blood components or plasma derivatives, or from the lawful transplantation or in-
sertion of tissue, bone or organs, except upon a showing of negligence on the part of
such hospital, blood bank, entity or person ....
68. 335 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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though the court specifically found that she could not prove negli-
gence.69 Recovery was denied, however, because the court found that
the crash was caused by an overload and not by the defect.70
In second collision cases, it seems even harder to find a case where
negligence could not be proved but strict liability could. However, it
is possible to conceive of such a case. For example, an automobile manu-
facturer may have come out with an automobile made out of material
"X." The manufacturer tested material "X" in an automobile which
was driven for one year and one hundred thousand miles, and the
material proved crashworthy. However, after material "X" had been
marketed, it was found that after the automobile was driven for over
two years and one hundred twenty-five thousand miles, the vehicle
turned into the "egg shell automobile," through a chemical change in
material "X" that no reasonable manufacturer would have expected.
The manufacturer would not be liable for negligence, but would be
liable in strict liability in tort, for the user would not have used the
automobile had he known of the defect.
Usually, the main difference between strict liability and negligence
will be in the defenses allowed. The only defenses for strict liability
according to the Restatement (Second) of Torts are assumption of
risk7l and misuse.72
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Probably the main practical difference in second collision accident
cases between a strict liability approach and a negligence theory would
be that, usually, contributory negligence would not be a defense in
strict liability cases but would be a defense in negligence cases.73 Even
69. Id. at 1132.
This case is thus a rare one in that the plaintiffs have proven the existence of a flaw,
albeit hardly visible to the naked eye, but not that its existence is attributable to
negligence on the part of defendant manufacturer. Recovery therefore can only be
predicated upon the concept of strict liability in tort ....
70. Id. at 1145.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Tos Ts § 402A, Comment n (1965).
72. Id. at Comment h.
73. Id. at Comment n:
Since the liability with which this Section deals with is not based upon the negli-
gence of the seller, but strict liability, the rule applied to strict liability cases . . .
applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence
consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product or to guard against
the possibility of its existence. On the other hand the form of contributory negligence
which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known
danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under
this Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the
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if contributory negligence is considered a defense, it should not apply
when a driver violates a rule of the road such as speeding, since it is
in this very situation that collisions occur and in this very situation
that we want the manufacturer to protect the driver.7 4
It may be that the failure of the driver and passengers to wear seat
belts would constitute contributory negligence. Most courts, upon con-
sideration of the question, have not recognized the failure to wear
seat belts as a defense. For example, in Breault v. Ford Motor Co.,75
the court rejected the seat belt defense, saying that not wearing seat
belts was the general practice in Massachusetts, and the benefits of
wearing seat belts had not sufficiently been brought to the attention of
the public. The court did say, however, that, as the use of seat belts
becomes more common, it may take a different position.
Horn v. General Motors Corp.7 6 was a second collision case in which
the horn capwas dislodged from the center of the steering column when
the plaintiff made a sharp left turn, thus exposing three sharp prongs
designed to keep the cap in place. In a subsequent collision, the plain-
tiff's face collided with the prongs, thus causing severe injuries. The
California Court of Appeals agreed that failure to wear seat belts
could be a complete defense if the omission of the use of a seat belt
was the sole proximate cause of the injuries sustained in the accident.
If the wearing of a seat belt would have reduced the injuries due to
the negligent design, the court said that the jury could take this into
consideration in reducing the amount of recovery. To determine how
much the damages would have been reduced, the defendant must pro-
duce expert testimony. Although Horn classified the seat belt defense
as assumption of risk, a better classification would be as contributory
negligence, for, while the plaintiff may have been unaware of exactly
what harm he would accrue by not wearing the seat belt, his negligence
defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make
use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
74. See Richman v. General Motors Corp., 437 F.2d 196 (Ist Cir. 1971), where the court
said that there was a cause of action on the second collision liability of an automobile
manufacturer, despite the fact that the plaintiff's intestate was driving her 1964 Chevrolet
Corvair in the wrong direction on a divided highway.
75. 305 N.E.2d 824 (Mass. 1973). See Kircher, The Seat Belt Defense--State of the Law,
53 MARQ. L. Ray. 172 (1970). This issue of the Marquete Law Review contains a symposium
on the seat belt defense. Some states have passed statutes which provide that failure to
wear seat belts will not constitute a defense, e.g. MINN. STAT. § 169.685 (4) (1969):
Proof of the use or failure to use seat belts, or proof of the installation or failure
of installation of seat belts shall not be admissible in evidence in any litigation in-
volving personal injuries or property damage resulting from the use or operation of
any motor vehicle.
76. 34 Cal. App. 3d 773, 110 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (appeal pending).
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in not wearing the seat belt did contribute to the harm. Second colli-
sion accidents seem the most appropriate place to allow the seat belt
defense, for since we insist the manufacturer foresee the possibility of
a collision, it seems we should also insist that the passengers foresee
such a possibility and take reasonable precautions. The use or nonuse
of seat belts "is pertinent on the very question of aggravation of in-
juries."7 7 It seems that with the new regulation requiring that an auto-
mobile will not start unless the seat belts are fastened,78 more courts
will recognize the seat belt defense, especially against persons who
short-circuit the starting system in order to defeat the safety precau-
tion.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK
The defense of assumption of risk is recognized under both the
negligence doctrine9 and the doctrine of strict liability in tort.80 For
the defense of assumption of risk to apply, the plaintiff must be aware
of the defect and yet use the product anyway."' For example, the pur-
chaser of a motorcycle should not be able to claim that it was not crash-
worthy because there was nothing to protect him in the event of a col-
lision. The purchaser was fully aware that the motorcycle was ex-
tremely dangerous, and he should not be allowed to recover when it
proves to be so. Similarly, the court in Dyson v. General Motors
Corp., 2 may be correct when they said that a manufacturer can be held
liable when his hard-top automobile roof failed to protect the passen-
gers after a collision. As the court pointed out, however, one cannot
apply the same liability to the manufacturer of a soft-top convertible,
for the passengers in that vehicle know that the roof will not protect
them if the vehicle turns over. It seems, also, that the manufacturer of
a large, expensive automobile should, in a particular type of second
collision accident, be held liable for the injury while the manufacturer
of an inexpensive, compact automobile should not be held liable for
that type of second collision. The purchaser of a small automobile
knows it will not stand up as well as a large automobile in a collision,
77. 110 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
78. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (S4.1.2.3) (1972). See Ford Motor Co. v. National Highway Traffic
Safe. Admin., 473 F.2d 1241 (6th Cir. 1973), for a decision declaring this regulation valid.
79. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORiS § 496A (1965).
80. Id. § 402A, Comment n.
81. See W. PRossm, LAw OF ToRTs § 68, at 440 (4th ed. 1971).
82. 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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and the purchaser of a large automobile feels that he is paying for an
extra measure of safety.
FORESEEABILITY AND MISUSE
According to the negligence theory, foreseeability is a portion of the
proximate cause of an injury and proximate cause must be proved by
the plaintiff.8 3 Even in negligence actions in second collision cases, the
issue of foreseeability should be very broadly construed. The manu-
facturer knows that in a collision any part of the body may hit any part
of the vehicle. Therefore, only in the most remote circumstances should
a particular type of injury be deemed unforeseeable by the manufac-
turer when the plaintiff claims that he was injured by the design
defect.8 4 In the question of the foreseeability of a collision, it must be
remembered that automobiles collide with an innumerable variety of
objects, and we should expect the manufacturer to foresee these possi-
bilities.8 5
According to the strict liability doctrine, we focus not on the ex-
pectations of the manufacturer, but on the product itself. Therefore,
we should not be concerned with whether the particular object an
automobile collided with was foreseeable to the manufacturer, but
whether the product should have been able to withstand the force of
the collision.86 For example, it may be that a manufacturer can rea-
sonably foresee that its automobile will collide with a tree, but cannot
reasonably foresee that the automobile will collide with a meteor which
falls on the path in front of the automobile. Yet, if the force the auto-
mobile hits the meteor with is the same as the force the automobile
83. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 109 (1966).
84. But see Schneider v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 401 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1968).
85. See Yetter v. Rajeski, 364 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.J. 1973).
It is obvious, of course, that automobiles are unhappily and almost continuously col-
liding with other motor vehicles, with trees, with culverts, with locomotives, and with
every imaginable type of object, either moving or fixed; that they are indeed, driven
off bridges, driven into water, and driven over cliffs; they are, in fact, involved in
collisions of limitless variety.
Id. at 108.
86. Cf. Foreseeability in Product Design and Duty to Warn Cases-Distinctions and
Misconceptions, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 228. See Dean v. General Motors Corp., 301 F. Supp. 187
(E.D. La. 1969), for a case concerning automobile design defects where the foreseeability
defense was allowed. In Dean, a stolen automobile hit the plaintiff. The manufacturer was
sued on the theory that it was negligent in designing the ignition lock so that a thief could
pry off the ignition switch, pry the cylinder out, break the retaining tabs, and start the
1961 Chevrolet station wagon with a screwdriver. The court held that the accident was not
foreseeable, pointing out that in its jurisdiction an automobile owner would not be held




would have hit a tree with, we should hold the manufacturer liable for
second collision injuries due to design defects, for the user of the auto-
mobile would have reasonably anticipated that the automobile might be
involved in a collision having that amount of impact, and, therefore,
the manufacturer should have taken reasonable precautions for the
passenger's safety.
When the force that an automobile collides with is not reasonably
foreseeable, the act which precipitated the collision would constitute
misuse. 7 For example, although ordinary violations of the rules of
the road should not be a defense in second collision cases, one being so
reckless as to drive at one hundred twenty miles per hour would be
misusing the product and should not expect compensation from the
manufacturer for second collision injuries. Similarly, we should not
expect a manufacturer to reasonably foresee the force of the impact of
an automobile falling off a high cliff.
THE Alexander QUESTIONS
One should not close a discussion of second collision liability of au-
tomobile manufacturers in which he advocates that there should be
some duty on the part of the manufacturer without answering the ques-
tions posed by Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co.,88 a case
which denied second collision recovery against the manufacturer of a
1965 Volkswagen which collided with a train. The alleged design de-
fects were a gas cap which flew off after a collision, a gas tank which
deformed upon a collision, an improper separation of the trunk from
the passenger compartment, and a flammable interior. The court stated:
If we abandon the time honored and well established interpre-
tations of proximate cause and embrace the Larsen rule which in-
cludes the extension of the "intended use" doctrine to injury pro-
ducing collisions, a flood of questions immediately arise.89
According to the court, these questions open up "Pandora's Box" and
point out the problems of allowing second collision liability. 90 The
following are the questions posed by the court and suggested replies
by this writer:
87. See Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Il1. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
88. 346 F. Supp. 320 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
89. Id. at 327.
90. Id.
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(I) "Are all collisions included?"9 '
All second collisions are included where the plaintiff has not as-
sumed to risk or misused the product.
(2) "Must the manufacturer be required to reasonably foresee only
head-on or rear-end collisions with other vehicles on the highway and
which occur within the speed limits? '92
No. Collisions from the side are common and should be foreseen.
Also, it is common knowledge that not all automobiles travel within
the speed limit and the manufacturer has a duty to foresee this up to
the point of misuse.
(3) "Would collisions with trees, boulders, buildings, or the stationary
objects off the right of way be included?"93
Yes, the force that an automobile may collide with any of these ob-
jects is foreseeable.
(4) "Must he foresee and design a vehicle to withstand a 114-ton loco-
motive engine pulling a freight train traveling at 45 miles per hour?"94
He should reasonably foresee it if a significant number of accidents
occur with the force of such a collision and the cost of making the
automobile safe in such a situation would not be unduly large. Prob-
ably, the manufacturer could not make an automobile safe in such
a situation without spending an enormous amount of money, so the
manufacturer should not be held liable.
(5) "Must the gas tank be in front or in the rear?"95
The gas tank should be in the part of the automobile where, accord-
ing to scientific evidence, the safety of the passengers is enhanced. If
there is no appreciable difference in the danger between a gas tank in
the rear and a gas tank in the front, a manufacturer should not be held
liable simply because in a given accident a gas tank exploded when it
was in the front but would not have exploded had it been in the rear.
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. Id. (emphasis added);
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id. (emphasis added).
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(6) "Can a fire-proof and crash-proof automobile be designed as long as
gasoline is the fuel to be used?"90
It may be that a fire-proof and crash-proof automobile cannot be
designed with gasoline as the fuel. However, no one is suggesting that
the automobile must be fire-proof or crash-proof, but only that the
automobile be reasonably safe taking into account the present state of
technology.
(7) "Must automobiles become tank-like vehicles?"97
No, the manufacturer need only take reasonable safety precautions.
He need not expend exorbitant amounts of money and make his prod-
uct unreasonably expensive.
(8) "Larsen recognized that there is no duty or burden upon the manu-
facturer as yet to design an automobile that floats upon the water. If
the vehicle must be "crashworthy", then why not include safety on
the water?"98
If the type of pressure exerted on an automobile while it is in the
water is foreseeable so as to not constitute misuse, and if the cost of
having a floating car would be reasonable taking into account the
likelihood of harm and the amount of possible harm, there is no reason
why we should not require that the automobile be safe when a driver
accidently drives into a body of water.
Each situation is different, but each can be solved by using sound
judicial reasoning. None of the Alexander questions poses a problem
too great for a court to solve.
SUMMARY
Because of the great possibility of harm second collision automobile
accidents can cause, there should be a duty on the manufacturer to
make its product reasonably safe for those involved in a collision. The
judiciary should supplement the legislative branch in establishing the
manufacturer's duty. Both the negligence theory and the theory of
strict liability in tort should apply in second collision cases. If contribu-
tory negligence is recognized as a defense, the fact that a passenger
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. Id. (emphasis added).
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did not wear a seat belt would be particularly appropriate to use as
a defense. Assumption of risk and unforeseeability so as to constitute
misuse should be recognized as defenses when the strict liability doc-
trine is applied. The manufacturer should make its vehicle reasonably
safe for a second collision, but there should be no duty to make the
automobile crash-proof or to make the manufacturer the insurer of the
passengers' safety.
JOEL M. DRESBOLD
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